This article is part of The Hivemaker's Code series:
- Article 1: Introduction
- Article 2: How do Ecosystems Grow?
- Article 3: Cooperating on Blockchain
- Article 4: The Satoshi’s Dream
- Article 5: Anonymity in the Cryptosphere
- Article 6: Democracy and Decentralization
- Article 7: Is Net Neutrality Important for Blockchains?
- Article 8: Why Interoperability is the Bedrock of Digital Freedom
- Article 9: The Way Forward
A balancing act between crime and an open society

Authors: Oliver Lukitsch, Michal Matlon, Gregor Žavcer, Thomas Fundneider, Markus Peschl, Lena Müller-Naendrup
Living in the twenties of the 21st century, we find ourselves in an increasingly surveilled world, ranging from our physical spaces to the digital sphere. Yet, privacy and anonymity are pillars of democracy and an open, liberal society. They enable social innovation, whistle-blowing, and investigative journalism around the globe.
The emerging Web3 is an expression of these basic and democratic societal needs. It provides us with digital networks and ecosystems in which people can move privately and anonymously.
The growing usage of blockchain technology now again raises the question of the negative effects of anonymity and the collateral damage it can do to our societies (see the widely discussed example of the Tornado Cash mixer). Let's go deeper into the topic with an example.
Imagine that you know an enthusiastic and knowledgeable crypto entrepreneur. One day, they present you with a convincing idea of a digital currency for a new ecosystem. You hesitate, then discuss it with like-minded aficionados, and eventually, you buy into the project.
The new currency gets traction. The yields look fantastic. One day, you check the charts and nothing. Your coin's worth: zero. The entrepreneur is nowhere to be seen and found. All that's left is empty promises and a crypto-project inexistent.
This is called a "rug-pull." A developer attracts investors to a project and pulls out before they realize the project. The investors are left with a worthless coin. It's a common crime in the emerging Web3, taking advantage of people's appetite for making a quick buck.
This is only one example of criminal activity in the blockchain world. Cryptocurrencies and DeFi protocols can also be used as effective money-laundering instruments. They can be used for credit card fraud, online grooming, and the exploitation of disenfranchised people for criminal action. Moreover, cryptocurrencies can be used as an anonymous, untraceable payment method on darknet markets. Like the famous, now non-existent Silk Road.
The anonymity of blockchain can create a safe harbor for illegal activities. Yet, it is also a vital instrument to safeguard the values of an open, democratic society. In this article, we explore the tension between anonymity/privacy and the need for policing in the cryptosphere. And we look at whether the former contradicts the latter.
What Crimes is Crypto Good For?

There are different types of crimes that crypto networks enable. We cannot provide an exhaustive list here, but we will attempt to provide an overview.
Purchases of illegal goods and Cyber Extortion
Blockchain ecosystems, first and foremost, indirectly impact criminal activities. They allow for safe, untraceable, and anonymous financial transactions. Such purchases do not have to happen on blockchain platforms per se. The dark net is one of the most important marketplaces for illegal drugs, weapons, and even for hiring assassins.
Moreover, it is used by hackers for blackmail, also called “cyber extortion.” The attacker (often using ransomware) steals data and threatens the victim to permanently deprive them of access, sell the data, or make it public. Then, they usually demand their ransom in some cryptocurrency, frequently in Bitcoin.
Rug Pull schemes
Rug Pulls evolved from blockchain technology and specifically from practices in DeFi communities. You recall our example at the beginning of this article. There are different kinds of rug pulls, as the crypto news platform CryptoVantage describes:
- Liquidity stealing: The example we provided at the beginning of this article is a form of liquidity stealing, meaning that, for example, a founder of a coin steals from the liquidity pool of the blockchain project.
- Dump scheme: When developers sell large shares of their tokens, thus crashing the currency's value
- Limiting sell orders: This is a version of a dump scheme in which developers create tokens that only they can sell.
Interestingly, rug pulls can be considered a cultural phenomenon independently of the technology that enables them. This is particularly evident when considering that the crypto technology being advertised does not even have to exist in the first place. For instance, in 2014, the company OneCoin Ltd. sold a digital coin that was not based on blockchain.
Moreover, in the case of rug pull schemes, the anonymity and privacy of blockchain networks are often only an indirect enabler of criminal activities. On the one hand, developers might already operate anonymously in the cryptosphere to pull off their scams. On the other hand, crypto projects draw in investors because of their value proposition involving decentralization, privacy, and data protection. Unlike in the case of laundering operations, blockchain technologies play a rather passive, fungible role.
One final note on the topic of rug pulls: Sometimes, it is easy to identify a crypto project as a rip-off. However, whether a supposed rug pull is an illegal scheme is a non-trivial question. For instance, some consider the Terra Luna crash a rug pull, while others argue it happened due to the bad design of what was supposed to be a stablecoin (TerraUSD).
Terrorism
At least as of 2020, there was only a little evidence that terrorist organizations have yet turned to the "cybersphere as a revenue-generating tool," according to Isaac Kfir from the Institute for Economics and Peace. Instead, they used digital platforms for propaganda and recruitment. One reason could be that terrorists see themselves as less technologically literate than national governments and their cyber intelligence services.
However, many terrorist organizations have made their members aware of cryptocurrencies as anonymous payment options. The "Islamic State" reportedly transferred Bitcoin, which was worth millions of dollars at the time, Kfir claims.
Still, for now, cryptocurrencies might be of limited use for terrorist organizations since, ultimately, their operations require goods that cannot be bought with Bitcoin and similar tokens. Moreover, the value of cryptocurrencies is volatile (even in the case of stablecoins, as Terra demonstrated). The upshot: terrorist organizations might find cryptocurrencies and blockchain assets simply too impractical for their goals.
In the current discussion, however, we might risk presenting anonymity one-sidedly as an enabler of crime. Yet, anonymity is not just a matter of convenience. Privacy and anonymity are crucial democratic values that support the functioning of democratic instruments and culture.



